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I E S EDEREGULATION, INTEGRATION AND MARKET STRUCTURE
IN EUROPEAN BANKING
Abstract (1)
This paper analyzes the impact of deregulation and market integration policies on
the structure of European banking markets. 
It argues that whether European integration will lead to large increases in EU-wide
concentration will depend on the extent to which competition in banking is based on
endogenous sunk costs or, alternatively, on variable costs and exogenous sunk costs. 
The paper also highlights the role of own funds as a source of endogenous
increasing returns. Finally, it proposes an empirical test of the dominant form of competition.
This procedure is applied to data for eleven EU countries during the period 1981-1995. 
(1) This is a revised version of the paper presented at the NBER/CEPR/Tokyo Centre for Economic Research
Conference on “Competition policy, deregulation and re-regulation” held in Tokyo, 18-19 December 1998.
Comments by T. Ito, T. Hoshi, X. Vives, J. Canals, C. Hurst and two anonymous referees are greatly
appreciated.DEREGULATION, INTEGRATION AND MARKET STRUCTURE
IN EUROPEAN BANKING
1. Introduction
The European banking industry has gone through a process of integration which
reaches its peak with the adoption of the single currency in 1999. The completion of the
single market for banking has involved the implementation of EU regulations aimed at
opening domestic markets and partially harmonizing national banking systems. Most
importantly, however, it has triggered in many countries the adoption of domestic
deregulation programs that have drastically changed the competitive regime. This paper looks
at the consequences of this joint process of deregulation and market integration on the
structure of European banking markets. 
Section 2 characterizes the completion of the integrated European banking market.
The paper highlights the key deregulation and market opening policies and constructs
country-level indicators that capture the different pace and extent to which EU member states
have opened their borders, deregulated the domestic market and adopted the harmonized
regulatory regime.
Whether EU member state banking markets become a single EU-wide market will
depend on the importance of entry barriers set up by incumbents and on the presence of
unexploited scale and scope economies in the industry. These issues are discussed in Section
3. The paper argues that if entry barriers are not too high, the characteristics in terms of seller
concentration of the resulting equilibrium with market integration will depend on the nature
of competition in banking. Following Sutton (1991) and Schmalensee (1992), I argue that
European banking markets will remain moderately concentrated if banks engage in
competition through standard strategic variables such as price or customer service.
Concentration is likely to increase (at the national and EU level) substantially, however, if
competition focuses on endogenous sunk costs, which in banking may refer to the
development of a brand image, the investment in electronic banking or the development of a
strong capital base.
Section 4 provides an aggregate empirical analysis at the European level aimed at
characterising the nature of banking competition during the period 1981-95. The parameter
estimates show that banking competition in Europe can be characterized as focusing mostly
on variable costs. If this type of competition continues to predominate in the future, we
would expect a process of national concentration without generating in the medium term a
significant increase in EU wide concentration.
A concluding section summarizes the main results of the paper.2. Regulatory change in European banking
Regulatory interventions in banking have been pervasive for many years and adopt
many forms. This section assesses regulatory changes in European banking markets from the
point of view of their impact on the competitive conditions in EU member state markets and
the extent of market integration.
We will, thus, distinguish three types of regulations (1) (see Table 1), depending on
their effect on domestic competition, the potential for exploitation of scale and scope
economies and the external competitive position of banks.
Table 1. Regulatory intervention in banking
Regulations that soften domestic competition
Controls on interest rates and fees
Credit controls 
Restrictions on entry
Restrictions on mergers and acquisitions
Controls on capital flows
Regulations that limit the scope and scale of banks
Domestic branching restrictions
Restrictions on establishment in foreign markets
Limits to activities within conventional banking 
Limits to activities in insurance
Limits to activities in securities
Regulations that alter the external competitive position of banks




Restrictions on ownership linkages with non-financial firms
European banking has undergone a profound process of deregulation, with changes
in the three categories of regulatory interventions. Only part of this process has been driven
directly by EU legislation. Let us consider the three types of regulations in turn.
Regulations that soften domestic competition
Consider, first, the regulations that stifle the development of a domestic competitive
environment and tend to support regimes of (implicit) collusion. This has been traditionally
the consequence of restrictions on the entry of new domestic firms, or limitations to the free
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(1) Obviously the impact of one specific regulatory intervention will in general depend on whether other
regulatory measures are in place. Moreover, some regulations will fall under one heading, but have an
indirect effect on other dimensions.deployment of competitive tools by firms (measures such as interest rate and fee
controls) (1). Further dampening of competitive rivalry results from controls of capital flows
that limit competition from foreign suppliers, particularly in wholesale markets where cross-
border activities are easiest.
Table 2. Elimination of restrictions on domestic competition















United Kingdom 1979 1979
Source: European Commission. The Single Market Review. Reports on the banking and credit sector
and capital market liberalization.
* Data for Austria, Finland and Sweden have been collected specifically for this project. Capital
flows controls for these countries refer to restrictions on investments and loans with foreign
institutions. For the rest, the date corresponds to the full liberalization.
In many member states the changes in the competitive environment have been the
result of a domestic policy of a gradual lifting of restrictions on interest rates, credit controls
and (in some cases) entry of new banks. In some countries the elimination of these
restrictions can be understood, however, as a pre-emptive move in the wake of EU integration
policy. Table 2 provides a summary of the key liberalization dates (2) and shows that there
are significant differences across countries.
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(1) The competitive impact of deposit rate controls has been analyzed in models of banking competition. These
models have focused on the effect on loan rates, but quite often deposit rate controls have been
implemented together with interventions in the credit market (i.e. investment coefficients). More
interestingly, economic analysis shows that the introduction of restrictions on prices shifts competition to
customer service (i.e. branching, to the extent that an increased network improves customer access). 
(2) In fact, some of these dates underestimate the pace of liberalization since they correspond to the
liberalization of all rates and many countries started the liberalization process earlier (i.e. France liberalized
fees in 1986, Spain and Portugal started the liberalization of interest rates in the late eighties). Table 2 does
not include credit controls since those were used only in some of the countries (the UK lifted restrictions in
1980, France in 1986 and Sweden in 1985. Spain introduced restrictions temporarily around 1990).Table 2 also shows the dates of liberalization of capital flows, and therefore reflects
the potential for development of cross-border banking. Note that the adoption of the EU
banking directives (the first banking directive and the second banking directive, see below)
which allow or reduce the cost of the operation of branches in other EU member states has
also had a significant impact on the domestic competitive conditions.
Regulations that prevent the exploitation of scale and scope economies
A second set of regulations comprises limits to the range of activities that can be
undertaken by banking firms. These constraints prevent the exploitation of economies of
scale and scope which may be important in the financial industry. Some regulations impose
restrictions on the lines of business of banks (i.e. restricting activity in insurance and
securities), and may even impose restrictions within conventional commercial banking (i.e. in
terms of the maturity of loans and/or deposits) (1). Sometimes there are limitations to
branching. This is particularly the case with regard to establishment in foreign countries. In
such an instance, of course, the regulatory intervention affects not only the possibility of
exploiting increasing returns, but also contributes to the maintenance of cosy competitive
conditions. 
This is a key area where EU directives have had a major impact. In particular, the
first banking directive  (FBD) and specially the second banking directive (SBD), with their
provisions for mutual recognition, home country supervision and the elimination of capital
requirements for branches within other EU member states, have allowed the exploitation of
scale economies related to branching in foreign markets with the associated advantages in
terms of risk diversification.
Note that other regulatory interventions that may restrict firm growth have been less
affected by EU laws. In particular, member states have decided unilaterally to lift restrictions
on branching of all or some institutions (i.e. Portugal in 1984, France in 1987, Spain in 1988
and Italy in 1990). Similarly, even if the second banking directive sets a list of activities
which are covered by the single passport, there is still some scope for differences across
countries in terms of the kind of activities that may be pursued by banks in non-bank
financial markets such as insurance and securities.
European (continental) banking has usually been characterized by a universal
banking approach. By granting a single passport, the SBD provides an incentive (and a focal
point) for harmonization. However, the SBD does not include insurance activities. Overall,
differences across countries persist (see Table 3). However, they do not appear to be of
practical significance compared with the differences relative to other OECD countries (such
as the US and Japan) and they are unlikely to constitute a source of competitive advantage for
banks facing a less restrictive regime.
Regulations that alter the external competitive position of banks
The third category of regulatory intervention includes several measures that
influence the cost of funds and, as a consequence, the external competitive position of
domestic banks. Prudential regulations such as solvency and own funds requirements, limits
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(1) By and large, member states that had important specialized institutions have reduced the segmentation of
the domestic industry (i.e. France in 1984, Italy in 1993, the UK in 1985, Spain in 1991, Sweden in 1987).on large exposures and regulations regarding participation in non-financial firms or activities
in real estate would fall under this heading. These prudential measures tend to impose
restrictive equity requirements and raise the cost of doing business of financial
intermediaries. Similarly, regulatory interventions that impose restrictions on banks’
investments (i.e. reserve or investment coefficients) produce an equivalent result to the extent
that they limit the free use of deposits and own funds. These  coefficients, however, have
often been imposed together with the controls on deposit rates mentioned above, usually with
a compensating effect on the cost of funds. Regulations referring to deposit insurance may
also be included to the extent that banks operating under standard insurance regimes enjoy
lower costs of funds. Government protection diminishes the incentives of banks to maintain a
large capital base and thus diminishes banks’ costs.
Table 3. Regulations that limit the exploitation of scope and scale activities
Member State          First Second
Banking Banking
Directive Directive Insurance Securities
Austria 93 93 Subsidiaries/Agent Unrestricted
Belgium 84-93 90-94 Direct/Subsidiaries      Restrictions on stocks
Denmark < 80 89-91 Subsidiaries Unrestricted, firewalls
Finland 93 93 Agent Unrestricted
France < 80 92 Direct/Subsidiaries  Unrestricted
Germany < 80 92 Subsidiaries/Agent Unrestricted
Greece 81 92 Direct/Subsidiaries Rest. on access, firewalls
Ireland na na No (some exceptions) Unrestricted
Italy 85 92-93 Direct/Subsidiaries Rest. on access, firewalls
Luxembourg 81 93 Subsidiaries/Agent Unrestricted
Netherlands < 80 92 Direct/Subsidiaries  Unrestricted
Portugal 86-92 92 Subsidiaries/Agent Restrictions on access
Spain 86-87 92-94 Direct/Subsidiaries Restrictions on access
Sweden 93 93 Direct/Subsidiaries Unrestricted
United Kingdom < 80 92-93 Direct/Subsidiaries Restrictions on bonds
<: before; na: not available. 
Source: European Commission and Barth, Nolle and Rice (1997)
Insurance situation as of 1995
Direct/Subsidiaries: Sale of insurance products may be conducted directly in the bank but
underwriting must be done through subsidiaries
Subsidiaries/Agent: Subsidiaries may underwrite and sell as a principal. Bank can sell only as an
agent.
Subsidiaries: Bank cannot sell directly. Only through subsidiaries
Agent: Bank can only sell insurance policies as an agent
Securities situation as of 1995
Unrestricted: Conducted either directly or through subsidiaries. No firewalls mandated
Restrictions on access: Unrestricted except no direct access to stock exchange
Restrictions on stock: Unrestricted but may not underwrite stock issues
Restrictions on bonds: Unrestricted, but bond market making through subsidiaries
Firewalls: Conducted either directly or through subsidiaries. Firewalls mandated
Restrictions on access, firewalls: Unrestricted except no direct access to stock exchange and
mandated firewalls.
5Many EU regulations have been devoted to harmonising prudential requirements.
The objective has been to create a level playing field by imposing minimum standards on
regulations which, on the grounds of solvency and stability, impose costs on domestic banks.
The EU directives include legislation on solvency ratios, the definition of own funds, large
exposures and others. Table 4 summarizes the pace of adoption of this legislation by EU
member states. The EU standards constitute only a lower bound on prudential requirements
and several countries have adopted legislation which is even more stringent.
As for reserve and investment coefficients, many of the countries with significant
interventions dismantled them in the late eighties and early nineties (France in 1987, Portugal
in 1994, Spain gradually up to 1992). Nevertheless, some differences remained across
countries with regard to the reserve coefficient, so that countries such as Belgium, the
Netherlands and the UK, where the coefficient was almost nil, coexisted in the EU with
others where by 1995 the level was still comparatively high (i.e. Germany and, in particular,
Italy).
Altogether, the information summarized in Tables 2 to 4 will be used later on to
construct a summary index of deregulation for each member state for the period 1981- 1995.
Table 4. Harmonisation of  prudential regulation in Europe
















Source: European Commission. The Single Market Review. Reports on the banking and
credit sector.
(1) The following directives have been included: 86/635 Consolidated Accounts;
89/117 Accounting documents of branches of foreign credit institutions; 89/299
Own funds and modifications (91/633); Solvency ratio (89/647); and the Deposit
insurance directive (94/19).
63. The integration of banking markets
The literature on market integration (1) shows that in conditions of imperfect
competition there is a wide range of factors which determine the degree of integration of
previously segmented markets and the structure of the resulting market.
First of all, the size of transport/transaction costs or the importance of consumer
preferences for local suppliers may segment markets naturally. Secondly, there may be
significant economic or legal barriers that prevent entry into new markets. Finally, there is the
extent of the economies of scale (and scope) which can be obtained by serving the whole
integrated economic area.
These points, and particularly economies of scale, are looked at below for the case
of the banking industry. The first step in the examination is to list the distinctive elements
which characterise banking activities.
The banking system basically has three functions (2):
1) To reduce transaction costs in payment systems by eliminating the need for
costly verification of the solvency of the parties involved in a transaction. This
heading of transaction cost reduction also covers the task of redenominating
assets, which banks perform by accommodating the desires of their deposit and
loan holders as regards net positions in financial assets. Normally banks
provide deposit holders with assets in lower denominations than those
generated in their loan and investment activities, reducing the indivisibility
generated in the investment process.
2) Term transformation of assets by granting long-term credits (non liquid assets)
and generating deposits which generally have more liquidity. In this activity
banks incur two risks: liquidity risk (since part of their deposit liabilities are
payable in the short term and their assets are not realisable in the same term),
and interest rate risk, insofar as fluctuations in interest rates can alter the
market value of assets and liabilities.
3) Transformation of the quality of assets. By delegation from their customers
banks manage credit risk by processing information and supervising their
portfolio of loans. These activities, together with the diversification obtained
by sharing risks, enable banks to issue securities of their own whose
profitability and risk differ from those of the assets on their balance sheet, and
which are potentially attractive to deposit holders and other potential
purchasers of bank debt.
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(1) See Baldwin & Venables (1995).
(2) Dewatripont & Tirole (1994, pp. 104-112) distinguish four functions: the reduction of transaction costs
through term transformation, the reduction of transaction costs in payment systems, delegated supervision
and the provision of liquidity. Freixas & Rochet (1997, pp. 2-7) list the following: payment services, asset
transformation (including adjustment of denominations and transformation of quality & maturity), risk
management and the processing of information and supervision. Finally, Vives (1991, p. 11) lists the
reduction of costs in financial transactions, portfolio management, the transformation of non liquid assets
into liquid liabilities by providing liquidity insurance and the diversification of risk to economic agents, and
the minimising of transaction costs incurred in supervising credit (see also the classification presented by
Battarchaya & Thakor (1993)).How far and in what way does the nature of banking as summed up in these three
functions condition the impact of a market integration process? Let us look first at the factors
which can keep markets segmented.
3.1. Differentiation and barriers to entry in banking
The establishing of a legally integrated European banking market as a result of the
introduction of the euro does not necessarily mean in practice that a single market is created.
First of all, in spite of advances in financial service provision with no need for
physical proximity, there are still high “transport costs” in retail banking and this means that
entry into foreign markets must be based largely on the opening (or acquisition) of a branch
network.
Furthermore, even though horizontal differentiation is hard to achieve in banking
(financial products are easily imitated), this is not incompatible with preferences for domestic
service providers, based on perceived quality (see below). These preferences may lead to
foreign competitors having only a very small share of local markets.
In fact it is difficult empirically to distinguish between this possibility and the
impact of economic barriers to entry. These barriers are sometimes inherent to the
deployment of banking activities, but may also be the outcome of strategic behaviour (1). 
One of the key features of banking that favours incumbents is the advantage in terms
of information enjoyed by local banks. Dell’Ariccia (1998) shows that informational
asymmetry hinders the entry of banks into new markets even when legal restrictions on entry
are lifted. In more informal terms, knowledge of the local market and information held by
banks about their customers (e.g. information on transaction deposits at the time of granting
loans) can give significant advantages.
A second source of incumbent advantage and a potential entry barrier is the
widespread network of branch offices owned by the leading domestic banks. Although these
networks are not, strictly speaking, an irrevocable commitment to market presence, they do
provide a formidable position of established capacity on the market, and may deter entry.
A third factor favouring local banks, especially the largest of them, is reputation
associated with size. In banking, perceived quality is often associated with perceived safety
and low risk levels, and this may come from size insofar as size permits a diversification in
loan investment and can even lead to expectations of intervention by regulatory bodies in any
hypothetical insolvency.
A fourth factor is switching costs. Banking usually involves a long-lasting
contractual relationship in which, from the customer’s viewpoint, any change involves
considerable cost: deposit holders attempt to make their current financial decisions
compatible with their investments in contractual relationships established in the past (2).
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(1) See Vives (1991) and Gual & Neven (1993).
(2) Klemperer (1992).Finally, it is well known that there can be political obstacles to the entry of foreign
banks via take-overs, given the role played by banks in payment systems and the financial
system in general (1).
3.2. Economies of scale in banking
There is a long tradition of analysis of the importance of economies of scale in
banking. In the face of an effective enlargement of the market to European scale, it is crucial
to assess the importance of these economies relative to the size of domestic markets and the
EU market as a whole. If we assume that integration is effective and strategic barriers do not
prevent entry, we then have to ask whether the size of national banks is optimal for the new
European environment.
This analysis can be carried out by looking at the three basic functions of banks.
In the area of transaction cost reduction there will be economies of scale if there are
increasing returns to banking operations, be it in asset or liability management. Here we must
of course include ATMs, branch offices, back-office software, Internet software, and the like.
If transactions technology incorporates these elements and not purely variable inputs such as
personnel, we shall find increasing returns.
Until recently, empirical evidence concerning the scale of the economies associated
with these factors did not favour the hypothesis of increasing returns (2). For instance, in a
review of the relevant literature in 1993 Berger and others concluded that unexploited
economies of scale might account for 5% of differences in costs, while 20% were accounted
for by X–inefficiency.
However, more recent studies during the nineties have changed this view, for various
reasons (3).
First of all, the method used predominantly in the 1980s (the econometric estimation
of trans-logarithmic cost functions) has been criticised for being an approach which cannot
be applied reliably to samples of banks with very different sizes and product portfolios (4).
Secondly, these studies use more recent data from 1990-95, in which the impact of new
technologies (and of the extension of the market in the USA) is probably more easily
detectable. Finally, savings in costs associated with risk have been incorporated into the
analyses of economies of scale. In view of the functions carried out by banks, it would seem
essential to include this area in the analysis.
In relation to the function of banks as providers of liquidity to their customers, size
entails a reduction in costs insofar as it permits a diversification of the customer base, and
therefore reduces the likelihood of a liquidity shortage. Hughes, Lang, Mester & Moon
(1996) develop a model in which geographical expansion enables banks to increase their
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(1) ERE (1996) mention the “general good” clause as a potential source of legal constraints within the EU to
entry by institutions from other EU member states.
(2) See Vives, (1991) and, more recently, De Bandt (1997) and  Davis & Salo (1997).
(3) The same cannot be said of economies of scope, whose empirical relevance is called into question (Berger
et al., 1993).
(4) McAllister & McManus, (1993).diversification and thus reduce the cost of covering liquidity risks. Naturally, if the bank is
not risk neutral, expansion does not necessarily entail any reduction in unit costs, as some
banks may use the opportunity to increase other risks. Krasa & Villamil (1992) argue that
reductions in risk will be offset by increases in supervision costs. However, economies of
scale might also arise in relation to the function of banks as credit risk managers.
Indeed, the very existence of financial intermediaries is in fact based on economies
in the process of information and supervision (1). However, economies of scale in
supervision are likely to be soon exhausted, and true savings are generated by the impact of
size on the risk (be it real or perceived) of loan portfolios.
First of all, size can in itself entail a reduction in the cost of obtaining resources
(deposits or borrowing) if there is a reputation (“too big to fail”) effect. Clearly, the largest
banks may be seen by customers as safer and may thus benefit from a lower cost of external
resources. Boot & Greenbaum (1993) develop a model in which they show that the existence
of deposit insurance eliminates incentives to create low risk reputation and thus entails a
more aggressive risk position, and with it an increase in size. Note, however, that a larger size
can also entail a diversification in assets, which reduces aggregate risk and thus also permits
a reduction in the (unit) cost of resources.
At an empirical level, there is evidence in the study by McAllister and McManus
(1993) of economies of scale associated in part with the incorporation of risk into the
analysis. These authors find that small banks in the USA (2) (those with less than 500 million
dollars in assets, and especially those with less than 100 million dollars) face cost
disadvantages of approximately 10% (3). However, in their investigation the cost function is
still U-shaped with a large flat section between 500 million and 10,000 million dollars. The
banks included in the sample have total assets up to 10,000 million dollars.
As indicated, however, empirical investigations in this field have changed over time,
with growing evidence being found of economies of scale. For example, Berger and Mester
(1997) use a Fourier function and, controlling for X-inefficiency, find that the disadvantages
arising from small size cause cost differences of 20%, a figure similar to that estimated in the
studies of X-inefficiency. This figure was found in spite of the fact that these authors did not
examine the largest banks (those with over 10,000 million dollars in total assets). These
authors include the role of equity and how it impacts on the scale of banking activities.
Hughes & Mester (1998) explicitly take into account that own funds constitute a
source of risk reduction (4) and model a cost function considering not only the impact of
equity on the cost of external resources but also the choice of the level of equity by the bank
in a model where the bank takes into account both the expected level of profits and risk.
These authors analyse a sample of large banks (with assets of more than 1,000 million dollars
for 1990 and 1991) and find economies of scale associated with the level of capitalisation of
banks which are statistically significant and quantitatively large.
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(1) See, for example, Freixas & Rochet, op. cit., page 29.
(2) Much of the evidence available is for the USA. There are far fewer studies for Europe, and those which
have been made provide, to date, results along the lines of the traditional US literature (see De Bandt,
1997).
(3) Earlier studies put minimum efficient size at just 100 million dollars (Berger, 1993).
(4) Recently, though this is not an estimation of cost functions, Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (1998) analyse a
sample of eighty countries for the period 1988-95, and find that well capitalised banks obtain higher
financial margins and higher profitability. They believe this to be consistent with a scenario in which banks
with better solvency ratios have lower financing costs due to the perception of a lower risk of bankruptcy.3.3. How do Banks Compete?
The consequences of European integration for the structure of banking markets
within member states and at the EU level will be determined by the characteristics of the
economies of scale in the industry and by the nature of bank customers’ preferences.
First of all, let us consider a situation in which banks compete on prices or unit
costs. This would make banking an activity in which firms compete for market share by
means of a variable expense, closely linked to their level of intermediation. This alternative
covers both competition through higher interest rates on deposits (or lower interest rates on
loans) as well as strategies based on improving customer service. In this last case, market
share is increased by committing more resources (for example, more qualified personnel) per
customer or per unit of assets or liabilities intermediated.
It must also be observed that competition through services which improve access to
the bank by clients (e.g. branch offices and ATMs) is a similar strategy, in that the fixed costs
associated with a branch office (or a cash dispenser) are quickly exhausted in relation to
market size. The number of branches and cash dispensers (and their cost) grows along with
the level of intermediation of the bank. From an equivalent viewpoint, this is a type of
expenditure which ceases to be effective in gaining market share at comparatively low levels
(having two branches close to home rather than one is unlikely to modify the customer’s
willingness to pay).
Consider next, an alternative view of banking, even though it is not necessarily
incompatible with the previous one. Suppose banking involves activities in which capturing
market share (or increasing the willingness of consumers to pay) is achieved by committing
(non recoverable or sunk) expenses which are fixed, that is, unrelated to the volume of
operations or intermediation of the bank.
There are many examples of potentially relevant fixed expenses of this type: the
development of a commercial brand or image, software for Internet banking or back-office
operations, etc. In these cases the expense involved does not depend on the number of
customers or the volume of operations of the bank (1), but it affects the company’s ability to
compete. Using the terminology of Sutton (1991), these are endogenous sunk (fixed) costs.
These must be distinguished from conventional fixed costs (which Sutton refers to as
exogenous), which generate economies of scale but do not affect the bank’s ability to increase
its market share.
In fact, equity increases which allow banks to expand their size can also be
considered as a source of endogenous increasing returns. They affect market share via the
reputation perceived by customers. Even if it is not a fixed cost, it involves decreasing
marginal costs due to the risk effect discussed above.
The simple bank competition model developed below examines more formally the
implications of the nature of  competition on the equilibrium structure of the market in a
model with free entry. As in Sutton (1991) and Schmalensee (1992), the results show that the
impact of market growth on structure (summed up by an index of firm concentration)
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(1) In the case of Internet services and back-office operations software development is independent of the
volume of operations of the bank, but of course this is not necessarily so for other associated costs such as
expenditure on telecommunications equipment.depends crucially on how companies compete. If competition is based on variable costs, the
market tends to fragment as its size increases. At the opposite extreme, if rivalry is centred on
endogenous sunk costs there is a downward limit and concentration is not necessarily
reduced when the market grows (1).
The implications of this result for the structure of the future European banking
market are clear: if the fixed cost competition model dominates there will be a strong trend
towards pan-European concentration in the coming years. If, however, the variable cost
model is more relevant the increases in concentration (which have already taken place in
part) will be less significant and may reflect the adjustment, at the member State level, to a
higher level of domestic rivalry.
3.4. A model of banking competition 
The model which I use is a variant of the Klein-Monti (2) model with bankruptcy
risk developed by Dermine (1986).
We assume that banks finance an asset whose value is a random variable a with a
density function f(a) and a distribution function F(a) defined in the interval (k,K).
The bank i maximises expected profits Π according to the following expression (for
the sake of simplicity the subscript i is omitted for the moment):
subject to the restriction b+l = d+e
where l(p) is the loan demand function and p its interest rate, g the interest rate on loans in
the public debt market (denoted by b), r the return on own funds e, and d(q,e) the deposit
supply function, which depends on the vectors of interest rates q and on the equity of the
various banks e. The first integral represents profits when the borrower can repay his debt,
and the second integral profits in case of borrower’s bankruptcy. The equity variable is a
proxy for solvency in a context of limited coverage of deposit insurance (3). We assume
therefore product differentiation on the liabilities side of the market. a* is equal to (qd-gb)
and indicates the asset value below which the bank is insolvent. 
By a simple transformation this expression can be written as:
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(1) An explicit application of a model of endogenous sunk costs with two stages to banking can be found in
Cerasi et al. (1998).
(2) The Klein-Monti model is subject to several criticisms. See, for example, Freixas and Rochet (1997, chapter
3). Nevertheless, it is a useful simple framework that captures some of the key implications of imperfect
competition in banking. A key assumption is the separability between the markets for loans and deposits,
which hinges upon the existence of an interbank market, the non-existence of contracts which tie loans to
deposits and the separability of the cost function between assets and liabilities. 
(3) Note that we include e and not the more conventional capital to assets ratio because the level of capital e
captures better the effect of “too large to fail” expectations on consumer preferences.






Max  (p –  g)l (p) + (g  –  q) (q, e) * (g  –  r)e   –  F  (a)  a p, q, e
a*
pl
[] ∫ δThe first order conditions in a bank oligopoly model in which N symmetrical banks
compete in loans, deposits and equity levels are as follows (1):
As in Dermine (1986), interest rates for deposits and loans are determined
independently. In Dermine’s model the inclusion of bankruptcy risk when there is no deposit
insurance does not modify the setting of the deposit rate in the Klein-Monti model, and
leaves the optimum level of equity undetermined. This is because it is assumed that deposit
holders know the function f(a). In our case introducing bankruptcy risk is relevant even in the
absence of deposit insurance, as the supply of deposits depends on the solvency of banks, and
therefore on equity.
We then assume a specific deposit supply function according to which the market
share of a bank i can be written as follows:
where
ε > 0
and u is a utility measure.
This market share function can be interpreted as the result of a random utility model
(see Schmalensee, 1992). The parameter ε captures the sensitivity of market share to changes
in u.
We then assume that the utility u derived by customers from operating with bank i
has two components: price q and the level of equity e. Using a Cobb-Douglas function with
parameter α (0 ≤α   ≤ 1) to add both factors we obtain the following expression for the market
share.
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(1) Since this is a standard model we will not be concerned with technical issues such as the existence of
equilibrium or the analysis of second order conditions. We focus on deposit-taking competition. Due to the
existence of an interbank market, loan market competition is not very interesting since the level of own
funds does not affect loan demand. Modelling two-sided competition becomes more complex if the
existence of an interbank market is assumed away (see Freixas and Rochet, op. cit., page 65).
(p  –  g) l
p  + l(p) –  F (pl)  p l
p  + l(p)   =  0
(g  –  q) l
p   –  d (q, e)  =  0 
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εwhere D is the size of the deposit market.
This enables us to express the first order conditions for q and e as follows:
Adding an exogenous fixed cost σ and imposing a zero profit condition we obtain
the following expression for the equilibrium number of companies N*:
Assuming that the elasticity ε equals 1, we can obtain in an explicit form the formal
relationship between the number of banks in equilibrium (the degree of concentration) and
the size of the market for the two extreme cases α  = 1 and α = 0. α = 1 shows a situation of
competition on fixed costs and α = 0 one of competition on variable costs.
Competition on variable costs
For α = 0 we obtain:
The number of banks grows with the market and concentration (the inverse of the
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If we relax the restriction that the elasticity is one (thus allowing for the possibility
of different degrees of competition as captured by ε ), the expression for the number of banks
in equilibrium becomes:
The linear relationship between market size and the number of banks in free-entry
equilibrium is maintained. As before, concentration declines with market size given any level
of competition.   
If we fix the size of the market (gD/σ ), greater competition on prices (larger ε ) leads
to less companies entering the market and therefore to a greater degree of concentration (1):
Finally, for most market sizes concentration drops faster as the market expands if
there is more competition (2). Conversely, the larger the market, the smaller the increase in
concentration produced by greater competition. In terms of the cross-partial derivatives these
results imply:
Competition on fixed costs
For α = 1, and assuming again that ε = 1, we obtain:
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(1) These results resemble, of course, those obtained by Schmalensee (1992), as one-stage equivalents of the
two-stage game results developed by Sutton (1991). 
(2) It is easy to demonstrate that both results require ε +2> (gD/σ ). Only if the level of competition is very low



























This means that concentration drops as the market expands, but it does so at a lower
rate than in the variable costs model. 
The expression for the number of banks in equilibrium when ε ≠ 1 is given by (1):
This implies that concentration is again negatively correlated with market size and
positively correlated with the level of competition, measured by ε . Note, moreover, that
concentration tends to N** (where N** = ε /( ε -1)) when the market tends to infinity. 
The effect of market expansion on concentration will also depend on the level of
competition. If ε < 1, the fixed costs model leads to results similar to the variable costs
model, since concentration tends towards zero as the market expands (a negative cross-partial
derivative).
However, for  ε > 1 the behaviour of concentration is radically different. Then, for
higher levels of competition the effect of market expansion on concentration declines.
Conversely, the larger the market, the stronger the pro-concentration effect of an increase in
competition (the cross-partial derivative is positive, see Appendix 1 for details).
In summary, the analysis of the two cases (variable and fixed costs) reveals that the
direct effects of market size and competition on the level of concentration are the same
whatever the nature of competition. If market size increases, concentration goes down. If the
level of competition is higher, concentration goes up.
The results also show that, for the most relevant parameter values, the key difference
between the two cases is how the effect of market size on the level of concentration changes
with higher levels of competition. With variable costs, increases in competition reinforce the
negative relationship between concentration and market size, whilst the opposite happens
with fixed cost competition. This difference between the two cases will be the basis of the
empirical test which is described next.
4. Empirical analysis
The theoretical model establishes some aggregate equilibrium relationships between
market variables which can be tested with market data. This analysis concentrates on the
relationship between concentration, competition and market size.
The following specification provides a simple setup which nests the two alternative
models under examination:
ln COit = β 0 + β 1ln Sit + β 2 Cit + β 3 Cit ln Sit + vit
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(1) See Schmalensee (1992).
1 2
N* N* gD  (1  –  )  +  
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where CO is a concentration variable, S is a market size variable, C is a competition variable
and v is an error term. The subscripts i and  t refer to countries and years for which
observations are available.
If banking competition takes place fundamentally on variable costs, the
concentration index should be correlated negatively with market size and positively with the
level of competition in a sample of countries with time series data. In terms of coefficients
this means that β 1 < 0 and β 2 > 0. Furthermore, as derived from the theoretical model, the
level of competition would be expected to affect the impact of market expansion on
concentration. In general, the higher the level of competition, the greater the effect of an
increase in market size on the decline in concentration. In terms of parameters this means that
β 3 < 0. This parameter restriction is, of course, also valid for changes in the level of
competition, so that increases in concentration entailed by greater competition are less
important in larger markets.
If competition is based on fixed costs, an increase in competition entails, as before,
an increase in concentration: β 2>0. The relationship between concentration and market size is
also negative  β 1<0. However, unlike the case of competition on variable costs, the combined
impact of both variables is positive in this case: β 3>0. For instance, the greater the level of
competition, the smaller the negative effect of an increase in market size on concentration.
4.1. The data
The data on concentration and market size for 1985, 90 and 95 is summarized in
Chart 1 for fourteen countries in the EU. Due to insufficient information on deregulation
changes, the empirical analysis was performed for eleven European Union countries with
data from 1981 to 1995. 
Chart 1. Concentration and market size in European banking (1985-95)
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Total banking assets in real US dollarsThe concentration variable is based on a standard concentration ratio (C5)
constructed as the percentage of assets at year end corresponding to the top five banks in each
banking system. lnCO is the logit transformation of C5 so that it does not take values
between 0 and 1. Thus:
Market size is measured by the total assets of the banking industry in constant
dollars (1). Two observations must be made at this point.
First of all, as derived from the model, the relevant variable is market size in relation
to the fixed exogenous establishment costs σ . We shall assume that these are the same for all
markets and do not change over time.
Secondly, the theoretical model shows that market size depends on the level of
interest rates (in the model, the inter-bank debt or public debt rate g which segments the loan
and deposits markets). Therefore, we shall use two alternative variables to measure market
size. The first is total assets and the second is assets times the interest rate, which is a
revenues measure.
Finally, the competition variable C is proxied with a variable which shows the
degree of deregulation of the industry. This variable is constructed with the information
summarized in section 2 on the adoption of liberalisation measures by European countries
between 1981 and 1995 (2). Two alternative variables are considered: the first is a variable of
annual indicators of the adoption of liberalisation measures (CA) and the second is
constructed by the cumulative annual indicators (CC). This second variable has a value
between 0 and 9 for those countries which implement all the liberalisation measures
considered within the period under analysis.
Finally, the analysis will allow the intersection term to differ from one country to
another, introducing a fixed effect. This will capture differences in concentration levels
between countries which are not explained by the right-hand side variables.
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(1) The data on total assets come from the Bank Profitability database of the OECD. Data on the leading banks
were collected from The Banker.
(2) See Tables 2 to 4. For the econometric analysis we have considered nine deregulation indicators, each of them
including different deregulation measures or directives. Before the adoption of the deregulation measure the
indicator takes a value of 0 and a value of 1 in the period in which the measure is adopted. Whenever a
directive has been adopted over several years, the unit value of the indicator is spread proportionally over the
relevant period.  For example, a country which adopts all deregulation measures in, say, 1993 will have a
deregulation variable of 0 between 1980 and 1992, of 9 for 1993 and of 0 thereafter. The cumulative
deregulation variable will, however, be 0 up to 1992 and 9 afterwards. The nine indicators are: 1) interest rate
deregulation; 2) freedom of establishment; 3) the implementation of the First Banking Directive; 4) the
implementation of the Second Banking Directive; 5) the liberalization of capital flows; 6) the adoption of the
directive on branch establishment and head offices outside the EU; 7) the adoption of the directives on
consolidated surveillance; 8) the adoption of the deposit insurance and money laundering directives; and 9) the
adoption of the directives on prudential regulation.  Whenever the indicator is composed of several directives
(as in 7, 8 and 9) all the directives included are given the same weight. Indicator 7 includes directives 83/350,








Table 5 provides a summary of the empirical results, and shows the regressions
performed using both ordinary least squares and least square dummy variables or fixed
effects. Furthermore, the estimation was carried out under the alternative hypothesis of
random effects. The overall results are also shown for various independent variables, given
the problems of specification mentioned above.
F-tests were run to check for fixed effects associated with the different periods
considered in the sample, but it was decided not to include them (1). Furthermore, the
regressions at the country level do not seem to indicate problems of autocorrelation. The
random effects model is therefore taken into account only for a random effect associated with
each cross-sectional unit. For this model the estimate of the proportion of total variance
associated with this effect is very high, so the model resulting from estimation with
generalised least squares should in principle be very similar to the model estimated with fixed
effects (2).
Altogether the results provide an estimated value for the parameter β 1 of
approximately –0.295, and for β 2, the competition variable parameter, a positive value of
0.246. Both parameters have the signs expected in the most suitable estimation, which seems
to be the one including fixed country effects and the cumulative deregulation variable as a
measurement of the level of competition. Parameter β 3 is negative in most specifications
(between –0.01 and –0.03) and although it is not always statistically significant, it is, as
expected, clearly lower in magnitude than parameter β 2. In summary, from the sample
analysed we cannot rule out the hypothesis of competition on variable costs in the banking
sector.
With regard to the magnitudes of the parameter estimates, the elasticities of
concentration to changes in market size (η S) or the degree of competition (η C) can be
obtained as follows:
η S = β 1 + β 2 Cit
η C = (β 2 + β 3 lnSit)Cit
Using as parameter values β 1 = -0.295; β 2 =  0.246  and β 3 = -0.012, the evaluation
of these elasticities at the sample means (see the descriptive statistics in Appendix 2) yields
the following results:
η S = - 0.3416   and  η C = 0.3537
The elasticity of concentration to changes in market size ranges in the sample
between –0.295 and –0.403. When evaluated at the sample means and keeping constant the
level of competition, this elasticity implies that a 10% increase in market size (from total
assets of 832,650 million US$ to 915,915 million) results in a 3.4% decline in the
concentration variable CO. In terms of the more standard concentration variable C5, this
implies a drop of 0.86 percentage points in the five-firm concentration ratio.
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(1) The F-test for the inclusion of fixed effects for each country is 12.45, with 14 and 139 degrees of freedom.
This test therefore favours a specification including this type of effect. However, the F-test to check the
possibility of adding time period effects has a value of 0.06, with 10 and 153 degrees of freedom. This
alternative is therefore clearly rejected.
(2) To estimate the random effects model we followed the method proposed by Judge et al. (1982), pp. 492-4.The elasticity of concentration to changes in competition ranges between 0.2522 for
the market with the largest size and 0.477 for the smallest market. When evaluated at the
sample means, and keeping the market size constant, an increase in competition of 10% (that
is, from a value of the indicator of 3.88 to 4.28)  leads to an increase in CO of 3.5%, which in
terms of the five-firm concentration ratio implies an increase of 0.86 percentage points.
Table 5. Regression results
5. Concluding remarks
This paper discusses the impact of deregulation and market integration policies on
the structure of European banking markets. The analysis focuses on the effect of market
enlargement on concentration ratios, taking into account the competition effects of changes in
the regulatory regime.
20






























































































































variablesThe paper argues that the recent US literature on scale economies in banking
highlights the existence of unexploited advantages associated with size, particularly when the
effects of risk are taken into account. Following the theoretical distinction established by
Sutton (1991) and Schmalensee (1992), this paper argues that whether European integration
leads to an increased exploitation of scale advantages or not will depend on the extent to
which competition in banking is based on fixed or variable costs. If competition focuses on
variable costs, concentration will diminish with market enlargement, when we control for the
pro-concentration effect triggered by the deregulation process.
Alternatively, if competition focuses on expenses unrelated to the level of
intermediation, concentration will not tend to decline as the size of the market grows. This is
due to the compensating effect of increased competition in fixed costs such as brand image or
electronic banking. The paper also highlights the role of own funds as a source of
endogenous increasing returns.
Finally, I propose a simple test using aggregate data that provides an empirical
assessment of the dominant form of competition. The application of this procedure to data for
eleven EU countries during the period 1981-1995 yields parameter estimates which indicate
that over the period of analysis competition in Europe tends to be predominantly based on
variable costs. On this basis, one would not expect large increases in European banking
concentration as a result of market integration (EU14 concentration in 1995 was about 11%,
way below the figures for Japan –22%– and the US –19%–), and we would expect
consolidation only at the level of some domestic markets. 
The data set used in this paper does not allow a test of the extent to which the form
of competition may have changed over time and further research should explore this
possibility. Past competition may have been based on variable costs, but this could be a poor
guide to future competitive conditions. 
Moreover, the model focuses on retail activities, even though most large European
deposit-taking institutions should be classified as universal banks. There is some uncertainty
about the nature of competition in retail banking but little doubt that corporate and
investment banking compete in a global market and are subject to substantial increasing
returns. These structural features of wholesale and investment banking tend to foster global
concentration. 
To the extent that large European banks engage in wholesale banking, the key
determinants of market structure in this industry may reinforce the trend towards fixed-cost
competition between large commercial banks. This could result in a dichotomic European
market structure where large pan-European banks coexist with geographically focused and
specialized institutions.
This tendency could also be reinforced by the growing competition from non-bank
institutions. Widening capital markets with the advent of the euro will facilitate entry and
thus promote both the growth of the capital market activitities of universal banks and the
appearance of smaller institutions specializing in capital market intermediation.
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23Appendix 1
DEREGULATION, INTEGRATION AND MARKET STRUCTURE
IN EUROPEAN BANKING
Concentration, competition and market size 
Variable costs ( α  = 0 )
The free-entry equilibrium relationship is given by:
where CR=(1/N*) and X = (gD/σ )




When X > ε +2  the cross partial will be negative. Otherwise, it will be zero or
positive. Note, however, that the condition X > ε +2 is equivalent to N*=(X+ε )/(1+ε ) > 2,
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Fixed costs ( α  = 1 )
Using the same notation as before, the free-entry equilibrium is given by:
In this case:
since 2CRε + (1-ε ) > 0  given  that CR is always larger than the lower bound ((ε -1)/ε ).
Similarly, 
With regard to the cross partial derivatives, we obtain the following expression:
This expression will be larger than zero if ε >1 and CR< (1/2) (or alternatively N>2).
If ε <1, the expression could be negative if 
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DEREGULATION, INTEGRATION AND MARKET STRUCTURE
IN EUROPEAN BANKING
Summary statistics
Variable Minimum Maximum Mean Standard deviation
C5 0.1931 0.9628 0.4977 0.1748
lnCO -1.43 3.25 0.0179 0.8343
TA(real) 28518.27 3817008 832650.1 870272.08
ln(TA real) 10.26 15.15 12.9392 1.3322
CC 0.00 9.00 3.8870 2.6538
N = 165
C5: concentration variable, measured as the five-firm concentration ratio in terms of
total assets TA(real): total assets in real terms (millions of US $) CC: competition variable,
measured as the cumulative deregulation indicator as described in the text.
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